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NOTE
HOME-FIELDDISADVANTAGE:
HOWTHEORGANIZATIONOF SOCCER IN THE
UNITED STATESAFFECTSATHLETIC ANDECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS
Carolina I . Velarde*
The United States men’s soccer team failed to qualify for the 2018 World
Cup . In the aftermath, soccer followers questioned the organizational struc-
ture supervised by the United States Soccer Federation . An analysis of the re-
lationships between professional soccer leagues reveals potentially
anticompetitive practices that may contribute to the subpar performance of
the U .S . Men’s National Team . This Note argues that the United States Soc-
cer Federation is engaged in economically anticompetitive behavior that im-
pedes the development of American soccer . Certain reforms, including an
open-league system and player transfer fees at the youth development level,
would enhance the economic and athletic competitiveness of soccer in the
United States .
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INTRODUCTION
On October 10, 2017, the United States men’s soccer team failed to qual-
ify for the World Cup for the first time since 1986.1 Following its defeat,
sports analysts, coaches, players, and fans called for change in soccer team
development in the United States.2 Despite its success in other sports, the
United States has struggled to reach the status of countries like Argentina,
Brazil, Italy, England, the Netherlands, and Spain as an elite soccer nation.3
Further, notwithstanding its large population, the United States has failed to
produce a single player with the skill and fan base of international stars like
1 . United States Fails to Qualify for 2018 World Cup After Loss in Trinidad, ESPN (Oct.
10, 2017), http://www.espn.com/soccer/world-cup-qualifying-concacaf/story/3226130/united-
states-fails-to-qualify-for-2018-world-cup-after-loss-in-trinidad [https://perma.cc/3QWK-
HS9X].
2. Kevin Baxter, After U .S . Team Misses Qualifying for World Cup, Ex-Coach Bruce
Arena Writes About State of U .S . Soccer, L.A. TIMES (May 7, 2018, 4:25 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-bruce-arena-20180507-story.html#
[https://perma.cc/X9RA-M35R]; Bryan Armen Graham, USA’s World Cup Failure Was a Ca-
tastrophe Years in the Making, GUARDIAN: SPORTBLOG (Oct. 11, 2017, 4:58 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2017/oct/11/usa-world-cup-2018-qualifying-
soccer-football [https://perma.cc/E89N-GUTB] (“[T]he US must address a series of systemic
failures and uncomfortable truths in the months and years to come. More money is flowing
into domestic soccer and youth development than ever. But for all the talk of Major League
Soccer’s hard-won stability, America’s top domestic league appears to have done more for the
Caribbean nations than the United States itself. Far more insidious, and alarmingly resistant to
change, is the pay-to-play culture that’s made soccer a sport that’s primarily played by upper-
middle class white kids.”); e .g ., ESPN FC, Taylor Twellman Goes Off on the U .S . Men’s Soccer
Team Missing the World Cup, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3kuMy9wUaw.
3. Neil Paine, Why Isn’t the U .S . Men’s National Team Better at Soccer?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 16, 2014, 3:41 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-isnt-the-
u-s-mens-national-team-better-at-soccer/ [https://perma.cc/82WE-ARQ6]; see also Karl Mat-
chett, Power Ranking the 25 Best Soccer Nations Based on Per Capita, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 19,
2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1573794-power-ranking-the-25-best-soccer-
nations-based-on-per-capita [https://perma.cc/3M2N-FH3Y] (“When (or if) the United States
takes the game seriously, there is such a potential pool of talent available that it might be hard
to stop them.”).
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Lionel Messi or Ronaldinho.4 Perhaps this is simply the result of a lack of
American interest in the sport itself. Or, conversely, the lack of interest may
actually be a consequence of the team’s poor performance.5 Either way, im-
proving American performance on the global stage and increasing American
fandom go hand in hand. Professional soccer’s anticompetitive structure is
ripe for a reform that could both improve athletic performance and increase
fan base interest. Indeed, in the aftermath of the United States’ unsuccessful
attempt to qualify for the 2018 World Cup, critics argued that American lack
of interest is caused by the United States Soccer Federation’s (USSF) unusual
organizational structure.6
This Note argues that the USSF is engaging in economically anticompet-
itive behavior that inhibits the development of soccer in the United States. It
contends that USSF should instead conform with Fédération Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA) regulations by adopting a promotion and rel-
egation system and improving the transfer system at the youth development
level. Part I explains the organizational structure of USSF, the differences be-
tween professional soccer and other American sports leagues, and the USSF
and FIFA governing rules. Part II argues that USSF’s anticompetitive prac-
tices amount to a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. These practices
degrade the athletic competitiveness of American soccer, inhibiting the im-
provement and expansion of development teams.7 Part III proposes reform-
ing the organizational structure of soccer in the United States by adopting
the FIFA regime in place of the current, anticompetitive USSF rules.
4. Matchett, supra note 3; Elliott Turner, Why Can’t the United States Develop a Male
Soccer Star?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2016, 5:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
football/2016/mar/16/why-cant-america-develop-a-soccer-star [https://perma.cc/5CN4-D54J].
5. John Tauer,Why Aren’t Americans More Interested in Soccer? Why Is the U .S . Bad at
Soccer?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 27, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/goal-
posts/201006/why-aren-t-americans-more-interested-in-soccer-why-is-the-us-bad-soccer
[https://perma.cc/K92T-DGVM] (“American soccer faces the classic chicken or the egg di-
lemma, because until they win, interest will not grow, but until interest grows, most American
youth will be unlikely to turn down opportunities in other sports to focus on soccer.”). In addi-
tion, interest in soccer has been growing among younger audiences. In 2012, the results from
the ESPN Sports Annual Report poll indicated that soccer was the most popular sport among
twelve-to-twenty-four-year-olds, ahead of the NBA, MLB, and college football. Roger Bennett,
MLS Equals MLB in Popularity with Kids, ESPN (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/soccer/news/story/_/id/1740529/mls-catches-mlb-popularity-kids-says-
espn-poll [https://perma.cc/WC5L-LUJ6].
6. Stephen Gray, The Problems with US Soccer, Examined by an Englishman,
URBANPITCH (Oct. 17, 2017), http://urbanpitch.com/problems-us-soccer-examined-
englishman/ [https://perma.cc/B2FE-2E3A]; Billy Haisley, U .S . Soccer Tries to Fix Its Problems
by Building a Bigger Bureaucracy, DEADSPIN (June 6, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://deadspin.com/u-
s-soccer-tries-to-fix-its-problems-by-building-a-big-1826615481 [https://perma.cc/C9G7-
SYRH] (discussing the creation of dubious management positions for the U.S. men’s national
team).
7. This Note generally uses the term “economic competitiveness” to refer to market
behavior and “athletic competitiveness” for quality of player and team performance.
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I. GETTING THE BALLROLLING
This Part provides background information on the structure of profes-
sional and youth soccer. Section I.A explains the configuration of organized
soccer in the United States market. Section I.B explains how professional
soccer is different from other sports leagues in the context of antitrust law.
Finally, Section I.C sets forth two key structural rules in soccer that most
countries follow but the United States has refused to adopt.
A. The Main Players in Soccer’s Organizational Structure
International soccer is hierarchical, and FIFA sits at the top.8 FIFA is the
governing body that oversees international organized soccer.9 It generates
hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue annually from its promotion and
oversight of tournament play.10 FIFA is divided into four general bodies: the
Congress, the Executive Committee, the general secretariat, and a collection
of standing and ad hoc committees.11These bodies govern the status of play-
ers, their transfer across teams, and compliance with relevant regulations.12
The next level in the hierarchy consists of six confederations, divided rough-
ly by continent.13 Each continental confederation has a governing body,
oversees a collection of national associations for each member country, and
can create separate rules and regulations so long as they comply with those of
FIFA.14 Similarly, each national association can create its own rules, provided
they do not conflict with the corresponding confederation’s rules or FIFA’s
rules.15 The national associations oversee all the individual clubs, which are
separated into divisions according to their level of competition.16 The United
States is a member of the Confederation of North, Central America, and
Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), one of the six continental
8. The FIFA Statutes are the overarching rules that guide FIFA’s governing system. See
FIFA, FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES;
STANDINGORDERS OF THECONGRESS (2018), https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/the-fifa-
statutes-2018.pdf?cloudid=whhncbdzio03cuhmwfxa [https://perma.cc/C3ME-KXCK] [herein-
after FIFA STATUTES].
9 . Factbox: What Is FIFA and Why Is It Such an Important Organization?, REUTERS
(May 20, 2015, 9:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-factbox/what-is-fifa-
and-why-is-it-such-an-important-organization-idUSKBN0O603Z20150521
[https://perma.cc/DU6W-MVDU].
10 . Financial Reports, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/governance/finances/index.html
[https://perma.cc/TRD7-HUBT].
11. Christina Lembo, Comment, FIFA Transfer Regulations and UEFA Player Eligibility
Rules: Major Changes in European Football and the Negative Effect on Minors, 25 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 539, 541–42 (2011).
12 . Id .
13 . Id .
14 . Id .
15 . Id .
16 . Id .
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confederations.17 USSF is the national association governing the sport in the
United States.18
Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes provides that member associations like
USSF can “manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own af-
fairs are not influenced by any third parties.”19 As a result, USSF determines
the structure of professional and amateur soccer organizations in the United
States.20
This Note focuses on the “Professional League Organization Mem-
bers.”21 These member leagues are organized into three divisions or tiers,
separated so that each division is roughly equal in athletic competitiveness
and quality.22 Division I consists of Major League Soccer (MLS) alone, the
preeminent professional soccer league.23 Division II, likewise, consists of on-
ly the United Soccer League (USL).24 The North American Soccer League
(NASL) was also a Division II member until USSF stripped its second divi-
sion status in the fall of 2017.25 In April 2017, USL announced the launch of
17 . About Concacaf, CONCACAF, https://www.concacaf.com/en/concacaf/about-
concacaf? [https://perma.cc/42H7-MDPX].
18 . See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–29 (2012).
USSF is the national association member of both CONCACAF and FIFA. USSF, BYLAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES SOCCER FEDERATION, INC. 1 (2018), https://www.ussoccer.com/~/
media/files/governance/2018/20180817-2018-19-bylaw-book.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/
97WH-28DF].
19 . See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 8, at 12.
20 . See infra Section II.C.
21. USSF’s membership categories are: (1) Associate, (2) Disabled Service Organization,
(3) Indoor Professional League, (4) National Affiliate, (5) National Association, (6) Other Af-
filiate, (7) Professional League, (8) State Association, (9) Life Member, and (10) Individual Sus-
taining Member. Federation Services: Membership, U.S. SOCCER, https://www.ussoccer.com/
about/federation-services/resource-center/membership [https://perma.cc/37SN-URM7].
22 . See generally Soccer Organizations: Professional Council, U.S. SOCCER,
https://www.ussoccer.com/about/affiliates/professional-soccer [https://perma.cc/FAN4-J4HE].
In the United States, Division I is the highest tier. In other countries, this tier system is funda-
mental to the promotion and relegation system, as teams in the bottom of the leaderboard for
Division I are relegated to Division II while the best teams in Division II are promoted to Divi-
sion I. See Daniel Nussbaum, The Impact of Sports League Structure on Fan Welfare (May 4,
2016) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Amherst College), https://www.amherst.edu/system/files/
media/Daniel%2520Nussbaum%2520Thesis_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEY2-XM3W].
23 . Soccer Organizations: Professional Council, supra note 22.
24 . Id .
25. Jeff Rueter, From Raúl to Ruin: The Rise and Fall of the NASL, Once MLS’s Challeng-
er, GUARDIAN: SPORTBLOG (Nov. 10, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
football/blog/2017/nov/10/from-raul-to-ruin-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-nasl-once-mlss-
challenger [https://perma.cc/CC7C-UGAW].
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a Division III league.26 The following chart reflects a partial representation of
this organizational structure:27
FIGURE 1
Partial representation of the organizational structure of soccer in the United States28
B. Different Ball Games: The Traditional U .S . Sports League Model and the
Soccer Model
Both the structure and the culture of soccer in the United States are dis-
tinct from those of the other professional sports leagues. The National Foot-
ball League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball
Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL) traditionally
26 . USL to Launch Third-Division League in 2019, USL (Apr. 2, 2017, 10:31 AM),
https://www.uslsoccer.com/news_article/show/775757-usl-to-launch-third-division-league-in-
2019 [https://perma.cc/J8UE-9KUP].
27. For a full list of national and international governing bodies, as well as U.S. Soccer
affiliates, see About U .S . Soccer: Organizational Structure, U.S. SOCCER,
https://www.ussoccer.com/about/about-us-soccer/organizational-structure [https://perma.cc/
HK65-HGFP].
28. For more information, see Lembo, supra note 11, at 541–42; Alanna Fairbairn,
What’s the Difference Between FIFA, CONCACAF, and USSF?, BACKLINE SOCCER (Oct. 26,
2016), http://backlinesoccer.com/whats-the-difference-between-fifa-concacaf-and-ussf
[https://perma.cc/2443-5J7R]; About U .S . Soccer: CONCACAF, U.S. SOCCER,
https://www.ussoccer.com/about/about-us-soccer/organizational-structure/concacaf [https://
perma.cc/SA9M-PLS3]; supra Section I.A; infra Sections II.B, II.C.
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dominate the sports market.29 Those leagues are built on contractual agree-
ments among independently owned member teams, which compete both
economically and athletically.30
This business model, where a single organizing body (the league) sets
the underlying rules of competition among independent teams, has given
rise to antitrust questions. In National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (NCAA) v .
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the NCAA faced an antitrust
challenge to its control over television-broadcast rights.31 While the Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that the NCAA went too far in restraining com-
petition, it also made it clear that sports leagues require a high level of coop-
eration among competitors for their products to exist.32 When sports teams
within a league agree to certain restrictions, they necessarily exclude poten-
tial competitors, suppliers, and distributors of their products.33 Accordingly,
the Court did not condemn the agreements as per se illegal and stated that
the decision “rest[ed] in large part on [the Court’s] recognition that a certain
degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that petitioner
and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved.”34
USSF has faced similar antitrust lawsuits for restricting competition. For
example, in 2001 the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission sued
USSF and MLS.35 The lawsuit alleged that the organizations had conspired to
prevent other professional soccer matches from competing with MLS- or
USSF-sponsored teams.36 According to the plaintiffs, USSF used “its position
as the purported sanctioning body for all professional soccer matches held in
the United States” to adopt and enforce blackout dates against non-MLS
teams.37 When USSF does approve a non-MLS match, it “requires the pay-
ment of substantial fees,” a barrier to compete that MLS does not have to
29. Edward Mathias, Comment, Big League Perestroika? The Implications of Fraser v.
Major League Soccer, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 208 (1999).
30 . Id .
31. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). As a nonprofit and amateur sports organization, the NCAA is
distinguishable from the major professional sports leagues discussed in this Section. NCAA,
468 U.S. at 88, 120. However, the Court’s discussion in this case is broadly applicable beyond
college sports alone. See id . at 85 n.18 (discussing analogues between the NCAA’s restraint of
trade in the college football television market to restraints of trade in other markets).
32 . Id . at 101, 104. The Court also quoted Judge Bork, “When a [hypothetical] league of
professional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal
on the ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams.” Id . at 101 (quoting ROBERT
H. BORK, THEANTITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978)).
33 . See id . at 101.
34 . Id . at 117.
35. Business Wire, Lawsuit Charges U .S . Soccer Federation and Major League Soccer
with Conspiracy to Deprive L .A . Soccer Fans of World-Class Matches, GENERAL ONEFILE (Nov.
13 2001), http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=lom_umichanna&v=2.1&id=
GALE%7CA80016374&it=r&asid=ca834292f1e4c5fdc81749ee56608461 [https://perma.cc/
L47W-YQTP].
36 . Id .
37 . Id .
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overcome.38 The plaintiffs argued that such restrictions on economic compe-
tition amount to unlawful restraints on trade, just as in NCAA.39
But American professional soccer is distinct in a crucial way: it is struc-
tured as a so-called single-entity league. While teams in the NFL, NBA, and
MLB retain economic autonomy apart from their leagues, MLS teams do
not.40 MLS is held as a single corporation rather than as a collection of indi-
vidually owned teams.41 When founder Alan Rothenberg designed the
league, he ensured that MLS would centrally own and operate the teams, as-
sign players and team personnel, and set local ticket and concession prices.42
Though MLS has investors, those investors own shares in MLS itself, not in
individual teams.43 And, unlike in other leagues, operators may run more
than one team at once.44
Because of this structure, “MLS retains significant centralized control
over both league and individual team operations.”45 This single-entity struc-
ture has shielded MLS from antitrust lawsuits brought under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which requires at least two colluding parties.46 For example, at
the time of Fraser v . Major League Soccer in 2002, the league owned all of its
teams, as well as “all intellectual property rights, tickets, supplied equipment,
and broadcast rights.”47 It was undisputed that “MLS sets the teams’ sched-
ules; negotiates all stadium leases and assumes all related liabilities; [and]
pays the salaries of referees and other league personnel.”48 But the league’s
control over player employment was most significant: it had sole responsibil-
ity for negotiating and paying players’ contracts.49 When the plaintiffs ar-
gued that all this control amounted to illegal price fixing, the First Circuit
38 . Id .
39 . Id .; Grahame L. Jones, Coliseum Commission Puts Up a Red Card, L.A. TIMES (Nov.
13, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/nov/13/sports/sp-3525 [https://perma.cc/QA74-
AHZR].
40 . SeeMathias, supra note 29, at 208–09.
41 . Id . at 203–04 (citing Denise Kiernan, MLS: Living Single?, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 30,
1997, at 133).
42 . Id . at 221.
43 . Id .
44 . Id . at 222.
45. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2002).
46 . See infra Section II.A. But see Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S.
183, 195 (2010) (“The relevant inquiry . . . is whether there is a ‘contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy’ . . . such that the agreement ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of
decisionmaking,’ and therefore of ‘diversity of entrepreneurial interests.’ ” (first quoting Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984), then quoting Fraser, 284 F.3d at
57)).
47. 284 F.3d at 53.
48 . Id .
49 . Id . MLS also “recruits the players, negotiates their salaries, pays them from league
funds, and, to a large extent, determines where each of them will play.” Id .
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disagreed.50 Instead, the court found that MLS achieved “real economic inte-
gration,” meaning that the single-entity structure was not merely “a sham for
horizontal price fixing” but rather created real economic competition and
“new opportunities for players.”51
USSF and MLS continue to rely on the Fraser decision when they wield
decisionmaking authority over their member leagues and teams.52 The plain-
tiffs’ argument in Fraser was doomed to fail because it alleged a conspiracy
within MLS, a single entity; but USSF is different. It is a distinct body from
MLS and USL, and Fraser has nothing to say about whether an allegation of
a conspiracy among those entities might stick.
C. Offside: Lining up the Open-League System and Transfer Fees with
Competition Laws
Although soccer players are traded from one team to another like assets,
soccer teams in the United States cannot move from one division to another.
In the rest of the soccer-playing world, by contrast, teams are moved be-
tween divisions based on their season’s performance. Imagine if the Cleve-
land Browns were kicked out of the NFL and a team from the new Alliance
of American Football league was invited to take their place.53 This is called
the promotion and relegation (or open-league) system, which has been
adopted by all other major soccer leagues worldwide.54 Under the promotion
and relegation system, the worst-performing teams in a season are demoted,
or relegated, to the lower division.55 Meanwhile, the top-performing teams
are elevated, or promoted, to the higher division.56
50 . Id . at 59.
51 . Id . The First Circuit also stated that the case for expanding Copperweld Corp . v . In-
dependence Tube Corp ., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), was “debatable” and the case for applying the sin-
gle-entity label to MLS even more so. Id . The court went on to state that “the venture [could
not] be condemned by per se rules and present[ed] at best a debatable case under the rule of
reason.” Id .
52. Transfer fees and solidarity payments are forms of compensation that are negotiated
when a player leaves a team to move to another team. See infra Section I.C.
53. The Alliance of American Football is a new professional football league looking to
compete with the NFL. See ALLIANCE AM. FOOTBALL, https://aaf.com/
[https://perma.cc/Z8PP-LWF6].
54. Nussbaum, supra note 22 (comparing a closed league, where entry to the league is
based on the approval of current members, with open leagues where the promotion and relega-
tion system is used and there is a hierarchy of divisions). The promotion and relegation system
is included in the FIFA Statutes. FIFA Statute IV.9 explicitly states that “[a] club shall qualify
for a domestic league championship by remaining in a certain division or by being promoted
or relegated to another at the end of the season.” FIFA STATUTES, supra note 8, at 73.
55 . Premier League and Football League: Ups & Downs and European Qualification,
BBC (May 28, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/43402150 [https://perma.cc/XP9H-
8VFS].
56 . See id .
972 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:963
The number of teams that are promoted and relegated varies by league.
For example, in England, the top three and bottom three teams are promot-
ed and relegated, respectively, while in Scotland, two teams move up and
down.57 The risks of relegation or hopes for promotion are built into the cul-
ture of professional soccer. For example, following “Calciopoli,” the match-
fixing scandal in Italy’s Serie A in 2006,58 the most severe penalty faced by
the teams involved was relegation to Serie B.59 Juventus started the next sea-
son in Serie B at a thirty-point deficit that kept it out of the running to quali-
fy for the UEFA Champions League.60
In the United States, however, teams outside of MLS have no hope of
moving up. For example, despite winning the NASL title in 2012, 2013, 2015,
and 2016,61 the New York Cosmos still had to face the same subpar competi-
tion from other NASL teams in 2017. Meanwhile, regardless of how poorly
the worst team in MLS performs, that team will remain in Division I without
risk of being sent down to USL in Division II. For instance, after five seasons
of poor results, in 2012, Toronto FC conceded 62 goals and earned the low-
est points total—23 in 34 games62—in club history.63 Similarly, in 2013, DC
United earned 3 wins in 34 MLS games, “the fewest points per game of any
team in league history[,] and scored the fewest goals ever in an MLS cam-
paign.”64 Yet both Toronto FC and DC United remained Division I teams.
USSF’s concentration of power and support for MLS has allowed it to main-
57 . Id .
58. Rangan Basu, Calciopoli 2006: The Match-Fixing Scandal That Got Juventus Relegat-
ed, SPORTSKEEDA (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sportskeeda.com/football/calciopoli-2006-
match-fixing-scandal-juventus-relegated [https://perma.cc/9A32-XJMZ].
59. John Hooper, Juventus Hit Rock Bottom as Italy’s Cheats Are Relegated, GUARDIAN
(July 14, 2006, 7:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2006/jul/15/
newsstory.europeanfootball [https://perma.cc/W5Q3-X6N2]. Serie A and Serie B are respec-
tively the Division I and Division II leagues in Italy.
60. The UEFA Champions League is the annual continental competition between quali-
fying clubs around the world. See History: Background, UEFA.COM: UEFA CHAMPIONS
LEAGUE, https://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/background/index.html
[https://perma.cc/WG5P-QSFC]. The point deficit for Juventus was later reduced to nine
points. 10 Years Ago Today, Juventus Were Relegated from Serie A, FOX SPORTS (Jul. 14, 2016,
4:24 PM), https://www.foxsports.com/soccer/story/10th-anniversary-of-juventus-relegation-
to-serie-a-071416 [https://perma.cc/G6BK-CFR6].
61. J.S., Why Is There No Promotion and Relegation in the United States?, ECONOMIST
(Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.economist.com/game-theory/2016/11/23/why-is-there-no-
promotion-and-relegation-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/3EM7-YM6E].
62. Generally in soccer, teams earn three points per victory, one point per tie, and zero
points per loss. The maximum amount of points for 34 games would be 102 points. What this
point total indicates is that Toronto FC lost far more than they won.
63. Taylor Rockwell, The 10 Worst Teams in MLS History, PASTE (Dec. 1, 2015, 1:24
PM), https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/12/the-10-worst-teams-in-mls-
history.html [https://perma.cc/PY9A-MZ6T].
64 . Id .
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tain a closed-league structure, which is common in other American sports
but unique in the context of global soccer.65
In 2016, Deloitte released a report that considered the implementation
of a promotion and relegation system in American professional soccer.66 Ac-
cording to the report, live and broadcast audiences indicated that club soccer
in the United States has yet to “fully tap into the sport’s popularity.”67 The
report also noted that “[t]his presents long term challenges to the business
models and sustainability of clubs throughout the leagues.”68
The Deloitte report concluded that promotion and relegation could as-
sist pro clubs in capitalizing on the untapped potential of soccer in the Unit-
ed States.69 The report found evidence that “movement of teams between
leagues can, over time, be of a net benefit, increasing overall match attend-
ance.”70 In particular, the report found that even if the attendance gap be-
tween the Division I league—MLS—and the (at-the-time) Division II
league—NASL—was large, the evidence of the “uplifts achieved by former
NASL/USL teams entering MLS demonstrates that movement between divi-
sions in the medium term could also be of a net overall benefit in terms of
attendance in US soccer.”71
Beyond increasing attendance and match-day revenue, the report found
that the system could have a variety of other beneficial effects. These include
broader interest in leagues and seasons, “more compelling content for
broadcasters,” “motivated ownership at all levels,” furtherance of the United
States as “a global soccer nation,” and “long term growth of the sport.”72 Last,
the report determined that the increased opportunities and competition fos-
tered by a promotion and relegation system would assist with player devel-
opment at all levels.73 The report also suggested that “[t]he intensity of
competition for players would increase, as would the emphasis for
clubs . . . to develop their coaching infrastructure.”74 While the report con-
sidered a number of business risks that would arise from adopting the open-
65 . See Nussbaum, supra note 22; Jack Pitt-Brooke, MLS Stands Alone as a Closed Shop
in the World of Football . Meet the Two Men Trying to Change That, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 3,
2018, 1:08 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/ major-league-soccer-
promotion-relegation-usa-mls-la-galaxy-close-shop-a8237506.html [https://perma.cc/FFH7-
XQT3].
66. SPORTS BUS. GRP., DELOITTE, PROFESSIONAL CLUB SOCCER IN THE USA: AN
ANALYSIS OF PROMOTION AND RELEGATION (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/uk/Documents/sports-business-group/deloitte-uk-deloitte-sbg-silva-summary-
document-091116.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KSW-GV8P] [hereinafter DELOITTE REPORT].
67 . Id . at 3.
68 . Id .
69 . Id . at 4.
70 . Id .
71 . Id .
72 . Id .
73 . Id .
74 . Id . at 7.
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league system, it concluded that those risks could be mitigated.75 By contrast,
the longer-term growth prospects of club soccer may be inhibited by the cur-
rent closed-league system.76 The closed-league system aims to maximize
owners’ profitability and protect a league’s financial sustainability at the ex-
pense of product quality and competitive risk.77
Like an open-league structure, the transfer-fee market provides another
avenue for improving the athletic and economic competitiveness of Ameri-
can soccer. These reforms include training compensation and solidarity
payments. Training compensation is a fee the first professional club that
signs a player pays to the youth club (or clubs) he played for after his twelfth
birthday.78 It is also paid each time a professional is transferred before the
end of the season of his twenty-third birthday.79 Solidarity payments are re-
lated: any club that contributed to a player’s training or education between
the player’s twelfth and twenty-third birthdays receives a percentage of a
transfer fee that was paid to the player’s former club.80
The transfer market’s regulatory foundation is based on FIFA’s Regula-
tions on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP).81 Some soccer leagues
around the globe implement narrower transfer fee rules than what FIFA
suggests.82 FIFA’s transfer fee rules have not always been in line with Euro-
pean competition law.83 In 2000, FIFA faced pressure to comply with the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice’s (ECJ) 1995 Bosman ruling.84 In Bosman, the ECJ
ruled that transfer fees were incompatible with the right of free movement of
persons, thus limiting free transfers only to the end of contracts.85 To recon-
cile the increasingly exorbitant transfer fees with European competition law,
the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), which oversees com-
petitions in Europe, established the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations in
75 . See id . at 5.
76 . Id . at 6.
77 . Id .
78. FIFA, REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS 25 (2018)
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/regulations-on-the-status-and-transfer-of-players-
2018-2925437.pdf?cloudid=c83ynehmkp62h5vgwg9g [https://perma.cc/C5PU-878V].
79 . Id .
80 . Id .
81. Chapter VII, Article 20 states that “[t]raining compensation shall be paid to a play-
er’s training club(s): (1) when a player signs his first contract as a professional, and (2) each
time a professional is transferred until the end of the season of his 23rd birthday.” Id .
82 . See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
83 . See, e .g ., Thanassis Cambanis, Antitrust Officials Give Yellow Card; FIFA Must Re-
write Transfer Rules, WALL STREET J. (June 20, 2000, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB961445209957549428 (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
84 . Id .
85. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman,
1995 E.C.R. I-5040.
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2011.86 These regulations impose sanctions if teams spend significantly more
on fees than they earn overall,87 which can hamper the appraisal of a soccer
player’s worth.88 But some still question whether UEFA’s Financial Fair Play
Regulations will actually help promote competition between smaller, less-
funded teams and deep-pocketed teams, such as Manchester United.89
USSF has argued that, unlike UEFA’s rules and European competition
law, FIFA’s RSTP rules are at odds with U.S. antitrust laws.90 So far, United
States courts have avoided addressing this issue, and the merit of this argu-
ment is unclear. On the one hand, in Europe, transfer fees could be consid-
ered anticompetitive under EU competition law because teams with deep
pockets might have an advantage when negotiating contracts.91 By contrast,
antitrust laws in the United States do not punish participants for being
wealthier than their competitors.92 But on the other hand, transfer fees alone
do not fall under either Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. For a Section 1
violation, at least two parties must conspire to restrain trade.93 For a Section
2 violation, a party must be a monopolist or attempting to monopolize a
market.94 Neither theory of liability applies in this context. As the European
controversies show, there are legitimate antitrust issues to be sorted out
when regulating transfer fees. But USSF’s selective concern about antitrust in
this context is suspect. Instead of an outright prohibition, USSF should
adopt transfer fees because of their player development benefits. Rules com-
parable to FIFA’s RSTP or UEFA’s Financial Fair Play could be adopted at
the same time to assuage fairness concerns. In addition, an open-league sys-
tem would likely encourage the transfer of players from one division to an-
86 . Financial Fair Play: All You Need to Know, UEFA.COM (June 30, 2015, 12:12 PM),
http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html [https://perma.cc/K8AQ-
Z84N].
87. The rule states that “clubs can spend up to €5 million more than they earn per as-
sessment period (three years),” but clubs can exceed this level to a certain limit “if it is entirely
covered by a direct contribution/payment from the club owner(s) or a related party.” Id .
88. UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations are in line with European law. See State Aid:
Vice President Almunia and UEFA President Platini Confirm Financial Fair-Play Rules in Pro-
fessional Football Are in Line with EU State Aid Policy, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-264_en.htm [https://perma.cc/LF9S-3VM3].
89 . See e .g ., Gareth B. Jenkins, Football, Financial Fair Play and the Future of FIFA,
WARWICK, https://warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/features/footballfairplay/ [https://perma.cc/
N54Z-QASP] (quoting Professor Wyn Grant and Dr. Christian Stadler).
90 . See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
91 . See Jenkins, supra note 89.
92 . See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 370 (1962).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal.”).
94 . Id . § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felo-
ny . . . .”).
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other as teams attempt to strengthen their rosters. This would lead to more
transfer fees and additional revenue for teams that helped develop players.
While the United States is often an exporter of sports entertainment to
the rest of the globe, in soccer it lags behind. Other countries follow FIFA’s
rules: they have established promotion and relegation systems to regulate
competition across different divisions and they accept transfer fees as com-
pensation for developing players. USSF does not apply either rule. Instead,
USSF has enabled MLS and USL to conspire to take a competitor out of the
market, thereby further concentrating the professional soccer market.
II. BENDING THE STRUCTURE OF SOCCER IN THEUNITED STATES
According to a 2007 FIFA report, over twenty-four million people play
soccer in the United States.95 In 2014, more than three million young Ameri-
cans played formally for youth soccer clubs.96 As global soccer becomes more
competitive and interest in youth teams increases, USSF will face pressure to
provide a better platform for developmental soccer in the country. This Part
examines how USSF engages in anticompetitive behavior that prevents the
improvement and expansion of development teams. Section II.A shows how
the relationship between USSF, MLS, and USL is a conspiracy to restrain
trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Section II.B then discusses how
USSF’s role enables a horizontal agreement between MLS and USL that
keeps NASL from challenging MLS’s control of professional soccer. Finally,
Section II.C explains how the scheme constrains both the economic and the
athletic competitiveness of soccer in the United States.
A. Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Soccer antitrust suits typically arise under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which has three main components: (1) there must be a contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy; (2) that arrangement must have produced a restraint of
trade; and (3) the restraint must affect trade and commerce among the sev-
eral states.97 The first element means a violation must involve at least two
parties. A single entity, as MLS considers itself to be, is not implicated by
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 makes it illegal for competing busi-
nesses and other entities, including nonprofit organizations98 like USSF, to
95. Matthias Kunz, 265 Million Playing Football, FIFA MAG., Jul. 2017, at 13,
https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/bcoffsurv/emaga_9384_10704.pdf [https://
perma.cc/33KK-7PHQ].
96 . Who Is US Youth Soccer?, US YOUTH SOCCER, https://www.usyouthsoccer.org/
about/who-is-us-youth-soccer/ [https://perma.cc/F6CB-48Q9].
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW 188 (5th ed.
2015).
98 . See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
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conspire in ways that unreasonably harm economic competition.99 Many an-
titrust actions against other sports leagues are brought under Section 1.100
In the past, to escape antitrust liability, the NFL, MLB,101 NBA, and NHL
often argued—with mixed results—that they are in fact single entities, and
therefore, they should not be subjected to Section 1 challenges.102 For exam-
ple, the court in San Francisco Seals, Ltd . v . NHL explained that Section 1 of
the Sherman Act requires at least two independent business entities.103 The
court held that in the production of professional hockey games before live
audiences, the San Francisco Seals team was not an entity independent from
the NHL.104 In the context of American football, however, the Second Circuit
rejected the single entity defense in North American Soccer League v . NFL.105
It concluded that characterizing the NFL as a single entity would create an
antitrust “loophole” that could allow the league to adopt restraints to protect
individual franchise owners.106 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the single-
entity defense in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v . NFL, hold-
ing that, as a matter of law, the NFL was subject to Section 1 liability.107
Yet, in 2010, the Supreme Court finally proclaimed in American Needle,
Inc . v . NFL that the test to determine whether a party is a single entity de-
pends on “substance, not form.”108 In American Needle, the plaintiff sued the
NFL and the National Football League Properties (NFLP), an entity formed
by NFL teams to develop, license, and market the teams’ names, colors, log-
99. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (citing United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)).
100. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theo-
ry: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 26 (1991) (stating that many sports litigations
“allege that the teams of the various professional sports leagues, by collectively adopting and
implementing certain rules and regulations, have violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act”). Under Section 1, players also litigate league rules that affect their mobility (alleging that
such rules wrongfully limit their salaries) and challenge the legality of player drafts and other
exclusionary league rules. Owners of teams and municipalities have also used Section 1 to chal-
lenge league rules restricting franchise expansion and relocation. Id . at 26–27 & nn.7–9.
101. The MLB is also different from these other sports leagues because of the sport’s re-
serve system, which enjoys an exemption from federal antitrust laws. See WEILER ET AL., supra
note 97, at 197 (noting that the Court in Flood v . Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), distinguished
baseball from other sports operating interstate that are not exempt: football, boxing, basketball,
and presumably hockey and golf; soccer was not mentioned).
102 . SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 97.
103. 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
104 . San Francisco Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 972.
105. 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982).
106 . N . Am . Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1257 (“To tolerate such a loophole would permit
league members to escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that
would benefit their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit would
be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects.”).
107. 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
108. 560 U.S. 183, 184 (2010).
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os, trademarks, and related intellectual property.109 The Supreme Court re-
jected the NFL’s single-entity defense and decided that the appropriate in-
quiry is whether the agreement joins together “separate economic actors
pursuing separate economic interests” in a way that “deprives the market-
place of independent centers of decisionmaking.”110
Since American Needle, if an agreement indeed joins separate economic
actors, then a court could find that the parties were in a conspiracy in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, a court would have to de-
cide whether the restraint of trade is unreasonable. After American Needle, it
would be hard for MLS to argue that it is a single entity. In Fraser, a court
has already expressed doubt regarding MLS’s single-entity claim.111 Now,
under the separate-economic-actors test from American Needle, it is unlikely
that a court will find that MLS is a single entity: it is an organization com-
posed of separate investors with interests in separate teams, such that each
team-organization has separate economic interests. While MLS might aspire
to be the premier professional soccer league in the country, its individual
team investors are likely most interested in making a profit. Even if MLS
were to successfully argue that it is a single entity, MLS is still a separate eco-
nomic actor from USL: USL is a distinct business organization that oversees
a different professional soccer league with its own investors and teams.
Therefore, if the relevant market is all of professional soccer, where MLS and
USL are indeed horizontal competitors, a party could make out a viable
claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging that MLS, USL, and
USSF’s concerted action is in restraint of trade.
B. USSF: The Twelfth Man112 on the Field
The close-knit relationship between USSF and MLS can be tracked to
the origins of MLS itself. In 1990, Alan Rothenberg, who has been called “the
109 . American Needle 650 U.S. at 183.
110 . Id . at 195 (quoting Copperweld Corp.. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
769 (1984)). After applying this test, the Court in American Needle held that the concerted ac-
tion between the NFL and NFLP constituted a concerted action that was not outside the scope
of Section 1.
111. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2002) (“MLS and its opera-
tor/investors have separate contractual relationships giving the operator/investors rights that
take them part way along the path to ordinary sports team owners: they do some independent
hiring and make out-of-pocket investments in their own teams; they retain a large portion of
the revenues from the activities of their teams; and each has limited sale rights in its own team
that relate to specific assets and not just shares in the common enterprise. One might well ask
why the formal difference in corporate structure should warrant treating MLS differently than
the National Football League or other traditionally structured sports leagues.” (emphasis add-
ed)).
112. Generally, soccer teams have a maximum of eleven players on the field. The term
twelfth man implies that a team’s fans or the referee may play a potentially helpful role in the
game.
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most influential person in U.S. soccer history”113 and “Soccer’s Mr. Ameri-
ca,”114 was elected president of USSF.115 USSF won the 1994 World Cup bid
by committing to create a professional league by 1992.116 Rothenberg un-
veiled the plan for MLS in 1993.117 At this point, Rothenberg was the leader
in every facet of American soccer: he was the chairman and chief executive
officer of the U.S. World Cup organizing committee, president of USSF, and
chairman of MLS.118
The alleged conspiracy between USSF and MLS was formally challenged
in 2017. NASL sued USSF, MLS, and USL in 2017, claiming the three organi-
zations participate in a conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.119 That litigation is currently underway. USSF might respond that all the
other leagues—including MLS and USL—are subsidiaries, as they operate
under the umbrella of USSF.120 If a court recognized such a relationship,
then USSF could invoke Copperweld Corp . v . Independence Tube Corp ., in
which the Supreme Court held that a parent corporation and its subsidiaries
constituted a single firm for antitrust purposes and were exempted from Sec-
tion 1.121
But a claim that USSF, MLS, and USL comprise a single entity should
fail as a defense after American Needle.122 First, all three agencies are individ-
ually incorporated and managed.123 Second, most courts analyze this defense
under the test developed in Sullivan v . NFL, in which the critical inquiry is
whether the alleged antitrust conspirators have a “unity of interests,” or if
any of the defendants has pursued interests “diverse from those of the coop-
113. Heike K. Sullivan, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLS’s Single-Entity Structure
Is a “Sham,” 73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 888 (2000) (quoting Jerry Langdon, Rothenberg the Rozelle
of U .S . Soccer, GANNETTNEWS SERV., Aug. 18, 1998).
114. Steve Berkowitz, Alan Rothenberg: Soccer’s Mr . America, WASH. POST (June 7, 1994),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1994/06/07/alan-rothenberg-soccers-mr-
america/42adb8d4-bcc1-4b5d-97cf-0ec4ff81a211/ [https://perma.cc/QX44-UVC4].
115 . Id .
116 . New League Is Unveiled for U .S ., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/20/sports/20iht-league_0.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
117 . Id .
118 . See Berkowitz, supra note 114.
119. Complaint, N. Am. Soccer League v. U.S. Soccer Federation, No. 1:17-cv-5495
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017).
120 . See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
121. 467 U.S. 752, 771–72 (1984).
122. American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
123 . Company Overview of Major League Soccer, LLC, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=4312581
[https://perma.cc/P2BD-4Q85]; Company Overview of United Soccer Leagues, LLC,
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?
privcapId=62366513, [https://perma.cc/M9HF-D2DW]; Company Overview of U .S . Soccer
Federation, Inc ., BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/
snapshot.asp?privcapid=6519300 [https://perma.cc/KB22-T3QD].
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erative itself.”124 Like the NFL teams in Sullivan, USSF, MLS, NASL, and USL
have diverse interests: they compete with one another for “fan support, play-
ers, coaches, ticket sales, local broadcast revenues, and the sale of team [mer-
chandise].”125 They are likely separate entities to the extent that they are able
to reach an agreement or collude with one another.
Even more worrisome than the preferential relationship between USSF
and MLS is the public relationship between MLS and USL. USL has agreed
not to compete with MLS for Division I status, USSF has approved USL’s
Division II status, and USSF has declined to renew NASL’s Division II’s sta-
tus.126 Throughout, MLS has developed its relationship with USL and
strengthened its bond with USSF. In 2014, MLS and USSF announced an
eight-year, $720 million broadcasting agreement with ESPN, FoxSports, and
Univision in exchange for the networks’ rights to telecast both MLS and U.S.
Men’s and Women’s National Team competitions through the end of
2022.127 Under the deal, USSF and MLS would together receive $90 million
each year while networks would be obligated to provide substantial market-
ing and promotional support to both organizations.128
Although MLS, NASL, and USL are independent entities that compete
for resources and fans, all three are subject to USSF supervision.129 In other
words, USSF has a vertical relationship with all three agencies. This supervi-
sion facilitates a “hub-and-spoke conspiracy” among upstream and down-
stream institutions through vertical restraints.130 A hub-and-spoke
conspiracy involves “a cartel in which a firm (the hub) organizes collusion
(the rim . . .) among upstream or downstream firms (the spokes) through
vertical restraints” facilitated by the hub.131 This collusion may violate anti-
trust law where the “agreement among the spokes (the rim) is per se unlaw-
124. 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec.
Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274–77 (8th Cir. 1988)).
125 . Id . at 1098.
126. Brian Straus, U .S . Soccer Not Extending NASL’s Division 2 Sanctioning into 2018,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: PLANET FUTBOL (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/09/05/
nasl-division-sanctioning-us-soccer-usl [https://perma.cc/N7L7-ASY5]; see infra note 150.
127 . See John Ourand & Christopher Botta, MLS’s Big Play, SPORTS BUS. J. (May 12,
2014), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/05/12/Media/MLS-TV.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XFW7-VVNN]; MLS, U .S . Soccer Sign Landmark TV and Media Rights
Partnerships with ESPN, FOX & Univision Deportes, MLS (May 13, 2014, 10:17 AM),
https://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2014/05/13/mls-us-soccer-sign-landmark-tv-and-media-
rights-partnerships-espn-fox-univision [https://perma.cc/NEE7-9JSE].
128. Ourand & Botta, supra note 127.
129 . See supra Section I.A.
130. A vertical restraint is a restraint in competition in a vertical contract, such as be-
tween a manufacturer and a retailer.
131. Barak Orbach, Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2016,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr16_orbach_4_
11f.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B6N-L7RU]; see also infra Figure 2.
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ful, such as fixing prices, or allocating territories or customers among com-
peting spokes.”132
When some restraints on competition are inherent in the nature of the
enterprise, however, some courts apply the “quick look” approach instead of
declaring that a restraint is per se illegal.133 For example, in NCAA, the Su-
preme Court used a quick look approach, reasoning that—even if the case
involved a fairly obvious restriction on output—the restraint occurred in the
context of a necessary restriction on competition.134 A court would likely re-
view the restraints created between USSF, MLS, and USL similarly. To
properly regulate soccer in the country, the United States needs an organiza-
tion to oversee and monitor the sport. USSF is that organization.
USSF’s vertical relationships with each of the “spokes” reduces the need
for horizontal restraints, but it enables the anticompetitive practices.135 En-
forcement in hub-and-spoke cartels is relatively efficient since the hub can
terminate and punish spokes that do not comply with its policies. In return,
the hub collects some collusive profits.136 Supervision from the hub can elim-
inate the problems of selecting and coordinating collusive strategies, moni-
toring members and deterring defections, and preventing entry or expansion
of nonmembers.
FIGURE 2
Representation of Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy Between USSF, MLS, and USL
132. Orbach, supra note 131.
133. This distinction is significant because, unlike the per se analysis, under a quick look
approach, the defendant may offer procompetitive justifications for the alleged anticompetitive
conduct.
134. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
135. USSF could argue that nonprice restraints on trade are not the types of restraints
with which United States antitrust laws are concerned. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.
v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–99 (2007) (holding that application of per se rule is unwar-
ranted as to vertical agreements to fix minimum resale price).
136. Orbach, supra note 131, at 2.
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NASL’s decision to include USL as a defendant in its lawsuit alleging
collusion is key to proving the hub-and-spoke cartel structure. What sepa-
rates an unlawful conspiracy of vertical relationships from a lawful vertical
arrangement is proof of a horizontal agreement (the rim) among competi-
tors.137 It would be hard to dispute that this structure allows for an agree-
ment between USL and MLS not to compete. In the last twenty years, USSF
has colluded with MLS to engage in anticompetitive practices that severely
affect the economic competitiveness of soccer in the United States. This, in
turn, damages the athletic competitiveness of soccer teams in the country.
NASL’s conspiracy arguments are not unreasonable. Although MLS and
USSF point at other countries’ arrangements to justify a single Division I
league, both MLS and USSF actively advocate against the promotion and rel-
egation system that most countries enforce.138 The concerted action of sepa-
rate economic actors—USSF, MLS, and USL—to remove NASL from the
professional soccer market, after NASL openly expressed an interest in chal-
lenging MLS’s control of Division I, should raise red flags for antitrust regu-
lators.139 NASL claims that USSF shields MLS from competition.140 It allows
for a “clearly defined hierarchy of lower-tier ‘minor leagues’ ” that do not
pose any competitive threat to MLS’s dominant status in Division I while de-
veloping a deeper, broader talent pool from which MLS can draw players.141
In contrast, NASL wanted to directly compete with MLS. As NASL de-
veloped, some team owners began to articulate a different vision for soccer
in the United States—one that conflicted with that of USSF, MLS, and
USL.142 Bill Peterson, the new NASL Commissioner, started calling for
changes to the USSF-sponsored soccer structure, including the introduction
of promotion and relegation.143 As a Division II league, the implementation
of the promotion and relegation system would allow NASL teams to com-
pete with MLS teams for a slot in Division I. Some, like the CEO of NASL
team Miami FC, argue that “[b]y adopting the rules followed by virtually
every other soccer playing nation around the globe, soccer in America will be
137 . Id . at 3.
138. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2002); J.S., supra note
61. USSF—the hub of the conspiracy—sanctioned only one Division I professional league, ar-
guing that “sanctioning rival leagues would dilute revenues, drive up costs, and thereby dim
the long-term prospects for Division I soccer in the U.S.” Fraser, 284 F.3d at 53. This is in line
with MLS’s contention that “no other country has sanctioned more than one Division I league
within its borders.” Id .
139 . See generally Kartik Krishnaiyer, The Changing Relationship Between MLS, NASL
and USL, WORLD SOCCER TALK (Aug. 30, 2015), http://worldsoccertalk.com/2015/08/30/the-
changing-relationship-between-mls-nasl-and-usl/ [https://perma.cc/H33N-5N4S].
140. Complaint, supra note 119, at 22.
141 . Id .
142 . See Krishnaiyer, supra note 139.
143 . NASL Chief Calls for Promotion and Relegation, FOURFOURTWO (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.fourfourtwo.com/us/news/nasl-chief-calls-promotion-and-relegation [https://
perma.cc/6YYW-Q5G6].
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open, resulting in better teams through all divisions, compelling story lines
to increase fan excitement and greater financial success for everyone in-
volved in this beautiful game.”144 NASL expressed its desire to compete with
MLS, but MLS ultimately reached an agreement with USL (which at the time
was a Division III league) “to house reserve teams for MLS clubs” and fea-
ture “an intricate set of player loans and affiliations between clubs in [MLS
and USL] leagues.”145 This type of explicit, nonprice agreement between hor-
izontal competitors is evidence of collusion to restrain economic competi-
tion.
In 2015, NASL submitted a formal application to USSF for Division I
status.146 In its application, NASL asked for a waiver of anticompetitive re-
strictions such as time zone and stadium capacity requirements, but other-
wise met all the Professional League Standards needed to obtain Division I
status at the time.147 According to NASL, instead of granting the application
for Division I status, USSF held the application and did not make a decision
for over nine months and, meanwhile, proposed new and more restrictive
Professional League Standards.148 These new standards effectively forced
NASL out of Division II. Ultimately, USSF denied NASL’s application to en-
ter Division I in 2016149 and instead granted provisional Division II status to
USL.150 In addition, USL announced its plan to launch a separate Division III
league in 2019.151 In effect, USSF created a market division wherein MLS
takes Division I soccer and USL takes Division II and III. Under United
States v . Sealy, Inc ., such market divisions are inherently anticompetitive and
considered per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.152
Even if USSF and MLS intended to protect the long-term interests of Di-
vision I in good faith, “good motives will not validate an otherwise anticom-
petitive practice.”153 As NASL argued in its September 2017 lawsuit, this
hard-lined Division structure is itself anticompetitive and unlawful because
144 . Miami FC Taking Promotion-Relegation Fight to Court of Arbitration for Sport,
ESPN (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.espnfc.com/miami-fc/story/3171424/miami-fc-taking-
promotion-relegation-fight-to-court-of-arbitration-for-sport [https://perma.cc/WR4B-54JA].
145 . See Krishnaiyer, supra note 139.
146. Complaint, supra note 119, at 24–25.
147 . Id . at 25.
148 . Id . at 26.
149 . Id .
150 . USL Granted USSF Provisional Division 2 Status, USL (Jan. 6, 2017, 9:08 PM),
http://www.uslsoccer.com/news_article/show/741595 [https://perma.cc/SY76-DMQA].
151 . USL to Launch Third-Division League in 2019, supra note 26.
152. 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967) (holding that market divisions in the form of territorial
limitations were unlawful under the Sherman Act without any necessity for inquiry as to the
business justifications or impacts on the market); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 608–10 (1972) (holding that market divisions were per se illegal despite argu-
ments that such practices increased competition by enabling members of the association to
compete with larger regional and national chains).
153. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 (1984).
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the application criteria arbitrarily favor MLS.154 In addition, the close rela-
tionship between MLS and USL with USSF is important for branding. For
example, prospective owners heavily weigh a league’s affiliation with MLS
when deciding which league to join. Warren Smith, the founder of USL club
Sacramento Republic FC, stated that, when balancing his options, affiliation
with MLS was the “trigger point” in his decision to join USL.155
USSF’s rejection of the promotion and relegation system that FIFA en-
dorses also amounts to a restraint of trade.156 It allows USSF to maintain
control over the rigid hierarchy it created and eliminate competitors, like
NASL, that challenge USSF’s closed league system. Similarly, MLS is op-
posed to adopting promotion and relegation because team owners fear their
investments could be undermined.157 Relegation would risk those invest-
ments.158
Given these anticompetitive effects, USSF should provide procompeti-
tive justifications for holding NASL to the new, harsher Professional League
Standards. These justifications must go beyond arguments that athletic com-
petition from teams in Division I or Division II sports leagues would destabi-
lize the quality of the Division I league.159 Indeed, a direct rivalry across
divisions would foster economic competition, which is the goal of antitrust
law in the United States. USSF, MLS, and USL need a sufficient procompeti-
tive justification that outweighs the negative effects that their hub-and-spoke
conspiracy has on the economic competitiveness of the United States soccer
market. And, if USSF, MLS, and USL cannot sufficiently justify their hub-
and-spoke conspiracy in procompetitive terms, then USSF should embrace a
market shake-up for its impact on both economic and athletic competition.
154. Brian Straus, NASL Files Antitrust Lawsuit vs . U .S . Soccer over Division Sanctioning,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/09/19/nasl-us-soccer-
antitrust-lawsuit-division-sanctioning [https://perma.cc/SH9M-KTQ7].
155. Nate Sulat, Building the Soccer Pyramid: Aspiring Markets Face a Choice Between
USL PRO and NASL, MLS (Apr. 25, 2014, 7:13 PM), https://www.mlssoccer.com/
post/2014/04/25/building-soccer-pyramid-aspiring-markets-face-choice-between-usl-pro-and-
nasl [https://perma.cc/CT7F-E6A4].
156. Jeff Carlisle, MLS Union Director Condemns Youth Clubs’ Lawsuit as ‘Terrible for
Players,’ ESPN (July 2, 2016), http://www.espn.com/soccer/united-states/story/2906712/mls-
union-director-condemns-youth-clubs-lawsuit-as-terrible-for-players [https://perma.cc/
MGC6-UDN2].
157. J.S., supra note 61.
158 . Id .
159 . See Zachary Zagger, Marketing Deal Joined US Soccer, MLS at Hip, Judge Told,
LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/979619/marketing-deal-joined-us-
soccer-mls-at-hip-judge-told (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Given [the] anticom-
petitive effect, Kessler argued the burden shifts to U.S. Soccer to prove procompetitive justifi-
cations for holding NASL to the standards, and that those justifications cannot simply be that
competition from another sports league would destabilize MLS. That is competition, which
antitrust law seeks to promote.”).
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C. Calling the Foul: The Conspiracy Between USSF, MLS, and USL Inhibits
the Growth of Developmental Soccer in the United States
Although NASL’s lawsuit focuses on USSF’s anticompetitive Profession-
al League Standards, the effects of the collusion between USSF, MLS, and
USL extend beyond professional soccer. Besides the economic effects associ-
ated with eliminating a competitor, the horizontal agreement between USSF,
MLS, and USL further affects the athletic competitiveness of youth develop-
ment teams and leagues.160 USSF’s facilitation of the horizontal agreement
between MLS and USL took a competitor out of the market, therefore con-
centrating the market. But apart from effects on economic competition, this
restriction also affects the athletic competitiveness of youth development
teams and leagues.161 This is best represented through USSF’s objection to
youth teams’ collection of transfer fees for the players they helped develop.162
In 2007, USSF created the U.S. Soccer Developmental Academy under
the U.S. Youth Soccer umbrella.163 Most of the teams in the Development
Academy operate under a pay-to-play model, in which players pay thou-
sands of dollars in fees per year just to be on the team.164 In contrast, MLS
160. Youth development teams are formal training programs through which young play-
ers can develop soccer skills for both recreational and competitive purposes. Michael Sokolove,
How a Soccer Star Is Made, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/magazine/06Soccer-t.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Revew).
161 . See Turner, supra note 4.
162 . See Liviu Bird, Youth Clubs File for Compensation, Solidarity on USMNT Stars’
Transfers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: PLANET FUTBOL (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.si.com/planet-
futbol/2015/09/03/solidarity-compensation-us-soccer-dempsey-bradley-yedlin-fifa-drc
[https://perma.cc/3SNA-ZAAN].
163 . See supra Figure 1. As of 2014, US Youth Soccer has more than 5,550 clubs as mem-
bers. Christian Hambleton & Michael K. Wheeler, Guest Post: Are U .S . Youth Clubs Leaving
Money on the Table?, JETLAW (June 20, 2014), http://www.jetlaw.org/2014/06/20/guest-post-
are-u-s-youth-clubs-leaving-money-on-the-table/ [https://perma.cc/ZJS8-D3DG].
164. Under the pay-to-play model, teams typically charge each player a fee of around
$1,200 a year (which can increase to $2,200 for traveling expenses). See Hambleton & Wheeler,
supra note 163; see also Peter Staunton, How Many Howards and Dempseys Are the US Losing
Due to Pay to Play?, GOAL (Oct. 13, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.goal.com/en/news/how-
many-howards-or-dempseys-are-the-us-losing-due-to-pay-to/4c10dtk0u17c16q7nsa1g3x4y
[https://perma.cc/ES3N-ZKJC] (discussing how Brad Guzan’s first club, the Chicago Magic,
charged $25 for a tryout and $2,095 upon registration for a season, and Jozy Altidore played
for Boca Raton Junior Soccer Club, where the Academy Program charged $3,000 per month
plus $125 for a uniform). When equipment, apparel, and other auxiliary fees are taken into
account, annual costs for parents might reach $10,000. Rick Eckstein, Until Youth Soccer Is
Fixed, US Men’s National Team Is Destined to Fail, CONVERSATION (Oct. 13, 2017, 12:19 AM),
https://theconversation.com/until-youth-soccer-is-fixed-us-mens-national-team-is-destined-
to-fail-85585 [https://perma.cc/UW6G-SEWH]. The annual costs for an MLS Developmental
Academy team to operate its U-16 and U-18 teams are around $600,000 on average. See Ham-
bleton & Wheeler, supra note 163. Many youth clubs offer scholarships, though those are lim-
ited and raise different issues. See Staunton, supra (noting that there are often stories about
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teams have official “youth divisions” that are subsidized by the league, such
that players can join for free.165 This economic edge, along with the prestige
of playing for a professional league youth team (MLS) instead of a recrea-
tional youth team (Development Academy), results in a closed talent loop
for MLS to recruit and retain players.
Experts, analysts, and industry members agree that youth development
is a central contributor to U.S. soccer’s failures.166 Player development in the
United States “will only improve when youth clubs can prosper financially
from producing an elite player.”167 MLS academies have been the biggest ad-
vance in U.S. youth development in the last decade.168 And unlike non-MLS
academies, MLS academies are free.169 This “free and elite instruction” model
is in direct contradiction to the “entrenched pay-to-play” model, which non-
MLS youth teams must use, as they do not have an alternative source of
funding.170 Since the majority of MLS players come up from unsubsidized
non-MLS academies,171 the talent pool is sharply restricted to affluent fami-
lies. Non-MLS academies could move away from the pay-to-play system by
following two regulations that FIFA has designed to address this issue: train-
ing fees and solidarity payments.172 USSF and MLS, however, have routinely
argued that these fees are illegal and accordingly discourage youth teams
from collecting them.173
In response, some youth teams have tried to challenge USSF and MLS’s
objections to solidarity payments. For example, in 2008 a prominent youth
parents complaining to the scholarship recipients and saying, “I am paying for your kid to be
here”).
165 . See Staunton, supra note 164.
166 . See Turner, supra note 4.
167 . Id .
168 . Id .
169 . Id .
170 . Id .
171 . Id .; see Sulat, supra note 155.
172 . See Turner, supra note 4.
173 . Examining the Governance and Integrity of International Soccer: Hearing Before the
Subcomm . on Consumer Prot ., Prod . Safety, Ins ., and Data Sec . of the Comm . on Commerce,
Sci ., and Transp ., 114th Cong. 46–47 (2015). In a written response to a question from Senator
Maria Cantwell, USSF responded that:
Consistent with the ruling in Bosman and given the antitrust laws of this country,
U.S. Soccer agreed in Fraser that it would not enforce transfer fee or similar re-
strictions that FIFA might impose on the movement of players who were “out of
contract.” Some aspects of the current FIFA RSTP may be considered applicable
to out-of-contract players and, therefore, the Fraser order would apply in those
circumstances. In addition, U.S. Soccer concluded, with the advice of outside
counsel, that enforcing the RSTP with respect to the training compensation and
solidarity payment mechanisms could be found to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States given their potential impact on the mobility of players.
Id . at 46.
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club, the Dallas Texans,174 filed a formal petition with the FIFA Dispute Res-
olution Chamber, which is an independent arbitration tribunal set up to set-
tle private legal disputes.175 They requested solidarity payments from
Fulham, a major professional club in the English Premier League, for the
transfer of Clint Dempsey, a star on the U.S. national team and one of Amer-
ican soccer’s most prominent exports.176
Even though the court never decided the merits of the case, the issue
drew attention from politicians. USSF was called to testify at a hearing before
the United States Senate. 177 At the hearing, a representative for USSF com-
mented on the Dallas Texans case, saying that “enforcing the RSTP with re-
spect to the training compensation and solidarity payment mechanisms
could be found to violate the antitrust laws of the United States given their
potential impact on the mobility of players.”178 He added that “[USSF] has
chosen not to enforce those aspects of the RSTP system that are of question-
able legal validity in this country and which might expose [USSF] to in-
creased legal risk.”179 Then, the general counsel of USSF sent a fax to FIFA
that disputed any payment because “the Texans were ‘not a direct member of
US Soccer’ and the payment ‘directly contravenes US law.’ ”180 The Texans
subsequently withdrew their claim.181
174. The Dallas Texans are one of USSF’s Development Academy clubs. DA Club Direc-
tory, U.S. SOCCER DEV. ACAD., http://www.ussoccerda.com/all-clubs [https://perma.cc/Y98T-
62YC]. Most players’ families pay an annual fee to participate, even though the club manages
its budget so that every team has scholarships available to players who are unable to pay. Histo-
ry/Vision, DALL. TEXANS SOCCER CLUB, https://www.dallastexans.com/page/show/2425798-
history-vision [https://perma.cc/UHB3-LG6W]. The club has relied on sponsors to reduce its
club dues. Id .
175 . See Bird, supra note 162.
176 . See Liviu Bird, More U .S . Youth Clubs, Including Dempsey’s, Join Compensation
Fight, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: PLANET FUTBOL (July 15, 2015), https://www.si.com/planet-
futbol/2015/07/15/us-youth-clubs-training-compensation-yedlin-crossfire-dallas-texans-
dempsey [https://perma.cc/K5WK-S33T]. In response to the petition, Fulham stated that Unit-
ed States laws prevented those payments, and therefore did not pay the transfer fees demanded
by the Texans (and technically required by FIFA rules). Id . Instead, MLS received the full pay-
ment for Dempsey’s transfer. Id . The Dallas Texans also sued in federal court seeking a decla-
ration that MLS could not file an antitrust complaint if the teams asked for the player
development fees. Dall. Texans Soccer Club v. Major League Soccer Players Union, No. 4:16-
CV-00464, 2017 WL 1174602, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2017). The court dismissed the case on
jurisdictional grounds and never ruled on the merits of the case. Id . at *4.
177. Liviu Bird, U .S . Soccer Answers to Senate over Youth Club Compensation Dispute,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: PLANET FUTBOL (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.si.com/planet-
futbol/2015/09/10/us-soccer-senate-youth-club-compensation-solidarity [https://perma.cc/
Z6MD-WM3P].
178 . Id .
179 . Id .
180 . See Turner, supra note 4.
181 . Id .
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USSF also claims that a confidential consent decree prohibits youth
clubs in the United States—which are also under the USSF umbrella182—
from taking solidarity payments.183 Some of these youth clubs are “actively
seeking $850,500 from clubs at home and abroad,” which “could fully fund
hundreds of players’ participation in youth soccer for one year” and margin-
ally reduce reliance on the current pay-to-play model.184 The pay-to-play
model assumes that the better an athlete, the more money a parent will
pay.185 But this excludes a significant portion of the talent pool who cannot
afford to participate. This shortsighted model inhibits the development of
American soccer stars.
Further, American youth teams currently do not benefit from player
transfers. For example, when U.S. national team start DeAndre Yedlin trans-
ferred to the prominent English team Tottenham, his old American team FC
Crossfire did not receive solidarity fees for the transfer.186 Instead, MLS took
100% of the transfer fee, including the portion meant for his youth clubs.187
Crossfire filed a petition with FIFA’s Executive Committee for the right to
collect fees on Yedlin’s $4 million transfer from Seattle Sounders (MLS) to
Tottenham.188 Crossfire received permission from FIFA to file a complaint
with FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber.189
The success of European club teams’ youth development shows how the
American model could be improved. Non-MLS youth sports leagues, for the
most part, are community based and run by volunteers rather than profes-
sionals.190 European club teams rely on a well-financed youth soccer cul-
ture.191 For example, Wesley Sneijder started at the Dutch team AFC Ajax’s
youth academy when he was only seven years old.192 Eventually, when he was
23, the Spanish team Real Madrid acquired him from Ajax for 27 million eu-
ros.193 That transaction included a transfer fee for Ajax’s academy, which fi-
nances the system going forward.194 The current structure of soccer in the
United States restrains the athletic and economic competitiveness of teams
182 . See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
183 . See Bird, supra note 162.
184 . Id .
185. Sokolove, supra note 160.
186. Bird supra, note 177.
187 . See id .
188. Jorge Arangure Jr., Youth Clubs File Class Action Lawsuit vs . MLS Players Union and
Dempsey, Yedlin and Bradley, VICE SPORTS (July 1, 2016, 6:15 PM),
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/4xzx53/youth-clubs-class-action-mls-players-union-
dempsey-yedlin-bradley-solidarity-payments [https://perma.cc/VW7P-SHD4].
189 . Id . The Chamber has not issued a decision at the time of publication.
190 . See Sokolove, supra note 160.
191 . See id .
192 . Id .
193 . Id .
194 . Id .
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and players. An open-league structure in which teams can be promoted and
relegated across divisions would further athletic and economic competition.
With teams and leagues in direct competition with each other, the open-
league system would create a better product for consumers over time. Like-
wise, solidarity payments and transfer fees would provide youth develop-
ment teams with needed resources to train future U.S. soccer stars.
III. CHANGING THERULES OF THEGAME
USSF, MLS, and USL’s conduct amounts to unlawful anticompetitive
coordination, and it is time for policies to change or regulators to intervene.
First, USSF and other professional soccer leagues should implement FIFA’s
RSTP promotion and relegation system. This will effectively eliminate the
market division and foster competition. Accordingly, teams will compete
athletically for slots in other leagues, and the leagues will compete economi-
cally for attendance, viewers, and marketing deals. The quality of both types
of competition will improve under this merit-based system. Demoted teams
will work harder to earn their spots back, and players will similarly work
harder to move to higher, more lucrative divisions.195 Likewise, team owners
and leagues will be motivated to recruit better coaches and players, finance
better infrastructure, and attempt to cultivate a sustainable long-term plan
for the team, instead of playing to win a single match or tournament.196 Inev-
itably, this would require investments in youth development programs.
But there are some risks to adopting a promotion and relegation system
in American soccer.197 For instance, the introduction of competitive risk
(relegation) and reward (promotion) could lead to a surge in player costs: if
players become more valuable commodities (due to their performance), club
owners’ interest in those players grows. Additionally, team owners might feel
that promotion and relegation is a major new business risk that could un-
dermine their investment. But there are strategies from the European system
that could mitigate these concerns. For example, cost control mechanisms,
such as UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations, could prevent teams from
spending more than they earn on players, capping market values.198 And new
195 . See e .g ., Billy Haisley, Chart: The Average Player Salaries in Soccer Leagues Around
the World, DEADSPIN (Nov. 14, 2014, 1:20 PM), https://deadspin.com/chart-the-average-
player-salaries-in-soccer-leagues-ar-1658856283 [https://perma.cc/5CCB-9F6E] (ranking the
salaries for different sports leagues around the world).
196 . See e .g ., Chris Smith, Soccer’s Highest-Paid Coaches, FORBES (May 7, 2014, 9:46 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2014/05/07/soccers-highest-paid-coaches/ [https://
perma.cc/B3XM-HQFY] (listing and explaining the salaries for well-coveted coaches around
the world).
197 . See DELOITTE REPORT, supra note 66.
198. Even if there are some increased costs, increased competition means increased reve-
nue to account for higher costs. Also, ruinous-competition arguments are not sufficient to win
antitrust claims.
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equity structures, revenue distributions, and market incentives could be used
to reassure investors.199
Another necessary step is allowing youth teams to collect transfer and
solidarity fees. Even if USSF and MLS are correct and allowing the collection
of transfer and solidarity fees would be a violation of U.S. antitrust laws,
USSF could follow UEFA’s model and create standards to ensure that RSTP
complies with U.S. antitrust law.200 Transfer and solidarity payments are cru-
cial to improve youth clubs, because they would fill in—and likely grow—the
source of income for those development teams, which would allow youth
soccer to exit the pay-to-play model.201
Under the current rules, MLS plays a role in negotiations over transfers
with foreign clubs.202 Speculators anticipate that MLS will approve a new rule
that would allow MLS teams to keep 100% of transfer fees for homegrown
players.203 It is unclear whether the new rule would eliminate MLS’s role in
those negotiations. If the rule change affects MLS’s position in negotiations
while increasing the teams’ autonomy, the rule could also affect the vitality
of the league’s single-entity antitrust defense. Additionally, this new rule
could foster economic competition between MLS teams.204 If and until such
a rule is implemented, MLS will continue to gift each team with the right of
first refusal for any youth players within a certain distance from the team’s
home. Subsequently, until rules change, this system will allow MLS to keep
199 . See DELOITTE REPORT, supra note 66.
200. For example, the United States could follow the UEFA initiative to reconcile transfer
fees and solidarity payments with European competition law. See supra notes 86–87 and ac-
companying text.
201. Grant Wahl, Landon Donovan Won’t Run for President but Eyes Active Role in Shap-
ing U .S . Soccer, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: PLANET FUTBOL (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/11/09/landon-donovan-us-soccer-president-election-sunil-
gulati [https://perma.cc/J2AM-E7HK] (interviewing Landon Donovan, former captain of the
US men’s national team, who said that he believes “in a perfect world pay-to-play [would be]
eliminated,” but that we do not live in a perfect world, and continuing to say that one way to
change the paradigm would be to incorporate training compensation to incentivize clubs and
change “clubs’ mindsets into ‘let’s develop players because that’s where we can make the most
money’ ”).
202 . See Paul Tenorio, Keep the Profit: Proposed Transfer-Fee Changes Give MLS Teams
Incentive to Sell, FOURFOURTWO (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.fourfourtwo.com/
us/features/keep-profit-proposed-transfer-fee-changes-give-mls-teams-incentive-sell [https://
perma.cc/DN8X-LGPC].
203 . See id . A Homegrown Player under MLS’s definition is a player who has been a
member of a club’s youth academy for at least one year and has met the necessary training and
retention requirements. MLS Roster Rules and Regulations 2018, MLS (Mar. 2, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://www.mlssoccer.com/league/official-rules/mls-roster-rules-and-regulations [https://
perma.cc/7FSP-FB55]. Currently, twenty-five percent of any homegrown transfer goes to MLS.
Tenorio, supra note 202.
204 . See Terence D. Brennan, For MLS, Liberalization Breeds Exposure, MEDIUM (Nov.
11, 2016), https://medium.com/@terryblaw/for-mls-liberalization-breeds-exposure-
d7627ff6cde6 [https://perma.cc/6AKL-63BY].
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the best players in MLS teams, instead of allowing players to choose where
they play.
Some have argued that the adoption of transfer fees in the United States
would have anticompetitive results. USSF has expressed concern that trans-
fer fee payments for development teams result in overpayment, as both par-
ents and future teams would pay a club.205 Yet, if the pay-to-play model is
eliminated, youth teams would not receive money from parents anymore,
thus neutralizing any double-payment worries.206 Some, such as the Fédéra-
tion Internationale de Footballeurs Professionnels (FIFPro),207 argue that
transfer fees are anticompetitive because only a few top clubs can afford to
buy elite players. These teams then go on to dominate their leagues, while
poorer clubs do not advance.208 FIFA’s 2017 Global Transfer Market Report,
however, shows that high transfer fees are not universal, and only about
fourteen percent of all worldwide transfers last year involved transfer fee
payments.209 Therefore, it is possible that concerns about market imbalance
are overblown, and some disparity between international teams is natural.
On the other hand, the value of international transfers within
CONCACAF is quickly increasing. Only five percent of the world’s interna-
tional transfers occur in CONCACAF, but according to an April 2016 FIFA
report, the average transfer value in the region has grown from $500,000 in
2011 to $1,100,000 in 2015.210 The report also stated that “[t]he fast growth
of CONCACAF’s two top leagues—MLS and the MX Liga—is partly reflect-
ed by the increase in the average value of players from North and Central
America.”211 Players from the United States have been involved in the most
transfers in the last five years—1,022—and the average fee per player for the
region is $745,000.212 If one youth team were to receive that full amount for a
player,213 that money could allow the team to sponsor hundreds of scholar-
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ships for players who otherwise could not afford to pay to play. Those schol-
arships would expand the talent pool in development leagues from which
MLS eventually draws. Therefore, while the amount of money in the market
increases, youth development teams are missing out on opportunities to ob-
tain additional funds that will allow them to support their soccer players.
The MLS Players’ Union also objects to allowing youth teams to collect
transfer fees and solidarity payments.214 The Players’ Union fears that trans-
fer fees and solidarity payments will devalue American soccer players and
hurt their chances of getting recruited abroad.215 According to the Players’
Union executive director Bob Foose, “it would be an act of antitrust against
its US player members and illegal in the US for the US Youth Clubs to en-
force . . . an award from the FIFA DRC of . . . training compensation.”216 Yet
soccer history shows that international soccer superstars are transferred and
recruited around the world, often to play in teams that do abide by the trans-
fer fees and solidarity payments regime. As the Neymar transfer shows, no
price is too high for a highly coveted player who might change the fate of a
team.217 In contrast, U.S. players are not as popular abroad because of the in-
ferior quality of U.S. professional soccer vis-à-vis professional soccer in
countries such as Netherlands, England, Spain, and Italy.
As European clubs directly fund development academies to train elite
players, USSF must reassess the sustainability of a youth development system
that lacks funds from training compensation and solidarity payments. But
when asked whether the United States could develop a unique system that
follows FIFA guidelines, a USSF representative responded that it would not
be possible because “the stated goal of the RSTP system is to compensate
amateur teams for their investment in player development.”218 Further, un-
like in many other countries, the cost of player training and development in
the United States is typically borne by families of young players.219 Thus,
while teams abroad continue molding future soccer stars, USSF supports
structural impediments that limit the athletic competitiveness of its talent.
Ending pay-to-play would improve diversity in the sport and open op-
portunities for talented children who would otherwise not have the money
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to afford enrolling in a youth club team.220 It would also increase the availa-
ble pool of players for coaches to recruit. As the chairman of USSF’s diversity
task force put it, “The [current] system is not working for the underserved
community. It’s working for the white kids.”221 Indeed, research suggests that
“[a]bout 25 percent of American families have incomes over US $100,000
annually, yet they produce 35 percent of youth soccer players.”222 Mean-
while, “the 25 percent of families with incomes below $25,000 account for
only 13 percent of youth soccer players.”223
But economic status does not equate to athletic ability. For example,
Tim Howard—goalkeeper for the United States men’s national soccer
team—has discussed how receiving an offer from Tim Mulqueen, a former
goalkeeping coach of Rutgers University men’s team, was a life-altering op-
portunity.224 In 1991, Mulqueen waived the standard $25 fee for private
coaching sessions because Howard’s mother could not afford it.225 Had Mul-
queen insisted on full payments for his services, Howard likely would not
have worked his way through the United States Olympic Development
Training Program or developed an international career.226 Apart from en-
hancing athletic competition, tapping into lower-income and inner-city
neighborhoods should help expand and diversify the soccer audience and
market.227
Unfortunately, the pending NASL lawsuit will probably not succeed in
its push for these changes. In the NASL complaint, the organization essen-
tially makes an argument about ruinous competition—that the collusion be-
tween USSF, MLS, and USL put NASL out of business.228 But antitrust laws
were enacted for “the protection of competition, not competitors.”229 Put an-
other way, the purpose of the Sherman Act is to ensure a fair marketplace for
consumers, not to prevent individual businesses from failing. Future chal-
lenges should instead focus on how any USSF-facilitated collusion affects the
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American soccer market writ large—from barriers for new players and teams
entering the market, to control of how consumers can watch and attend
matches.
Alternatively, a path outside the courtroom exists to promote soccer re-
form: appealing to FIFA. FIFA could intervene and sanction USSF for not
abiding by the RSTP guidelines and not adopting a promotion and relega-
tion regime. If FIFA persuaded USSF to create a Division I league in ex-
change for the United States’ opportunity to host the 1994 World Cup, it
probably also has enough leverage to force these proposed changes.230 Fur-
ther, because USSF exists under the FIFA umbrella, FIFA could require
USSF to be more transparent in its business with MLS. FIFA could first ask
USSF to reveal the contents of the infamous consent decree231 that prohibits
USSF from allowing youth teams to collect training compensation and soli-
darity payments. FIFA could also demand stricter conflict of interest policies
to prevent biases in USSF’s business relationships with its affiliate organiza-
tions. Still, from an economic and athletic performance perspective, USSF
should encourage competition between professional soccer leagues.
CONCLUSION
The lack of competition in American professional soccer leagues led to a
weak U.S. Men’s National Team that shocked fans when it failed to qualify
for the 2018 World Cup. In light of this colossal failure, fans are demanding
change.
U.S. soccer’s problems are rooted in anticompetitive policies across its
professional leagues and youth teams. The men’s national team’s recent fail-
ure is the result of years of USSF’s inadequate administration. Changes in the
organizational structure of the sport have been a long time coming. For
years, advocates for the adoption of promotion and relegation in profession-
al soccer have attributed the sport’s slow development to the lack of athletic
and economic competition within and across professional leagues. Yet, in
response to these calls for better competition, USSF has enabled collusion
between MLS and USL, which further concentrates the professional soccer
market and constrains the development of the sport.
By adopting promotion and relegation and putting an end to the pay-to-
play model in youth development, USSF can strengthen American soccer on
the field and in the market. The failure to qualify to the 2018 World Cup was
a wake-up call for fans of soccer in the United States. Now it is time for the
antitrust regulators to blow the whistle on the anticompetitive behavior off
the field.
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